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 In this paper I argue that any attempt to resist racialization needs to take 
account of the complex and often paradoxical ways in which notions of race and 
culture come to be articulated in conjunction with categories of nation, state and 
society. In the first half of the paper I consider some of the strategies used by UK 
Labour Party Ministers to counter ethnic representations of British identity by 
promoting the fact and value of post-Imperial Britain as a ‘multicultural society’. In 
the second half of the paper I consider some tensions within these arguments. First, I 
consider how the rhetorical formulations that the speakers use to justify the political 
project of UK multiculturalism implicitly presuppose a natural order in which nations 
are populated by a racially and culturally homogenous people. Second, I consider how 
their prescriptive recommendations that ‘we’ recognize and celebrate ‘our’ ethnic 
diversity do not in practice seek to establish the ultimate fiction of ethnic nationalism 
as a general ideological principle, but rather treat the fact and value of ethnic diversity 
as a uniquely British asset or virtue, in a manner that closely echoes the self-
celebratory rhetoric of British imperialism. Despite the claim that an ethnically 
neutral understanding of ‘British society’ will necessarily also entail a rejection of 
‘insular nationalism’, paradoxically these banally nationalized liberal utopian 
discourses of multiculturalism are in some respects more Anglocentric and less 
internationalist than the explicitly racialized versions of British identity promoted by 




 In this paper I shall be focussing on mediated communications that have been 
designed specifically to resist representations of society and citizenship in racialized 
or culturally exclusive terms. My general concern is to point to the complex, and 
sometimes paradoxical, aspects of social representations. In particular, I wish to 
emphasise that contradictions and ironies are not conveniently confined to forms of 
representation that we, as academics or as everyday social actors with a radical 
political consciousness, might view as morally or rationally deficient. Rather, the 
dilemmatic property of social imagery represents a more generic phenomenon, and as 
such may be identified in anti-racist as well as within racist arguments.  The general 
substantive point to which I draw attention pertains to the ways in utopian visions of 
an ethnically plural social and political sphere can often inadvertently adopt an 
implicitly nationally-circumscribed understanding of who ‘we’ are, and of who ‘we’ 
are ultimately ‘for’.   
 
National meta-representations: ‘Ethnic’ versus ‘civic’ formulations 
 In his seminal monograph, Imagined Communities, Anderson (1983/1991) 
famously distinguished the construct of nation, which he described as a system of 
‘positively-valued inclusion’, from the construct of race, which he described as a 
system of ‘negatively-valued exclusion’.  However, other commentators have 
considered the distinction between the constructs of race, culture and nation to be far 
less clear-cut, and have sought instead to detail the ways in which representations of 
societies and polities come to be, to adopt Gilroy’s (1987 p. 56) phrase, ‘saturated 
with racial connotations’.  Such concerns have not been confined to the reified 
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universe of academic debate.  Rather, Anderson’s (1991 p. 3) characterisation of 
nation-ness as ‘the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time’ 
arguably underestimated the extent to which social actors may routinely struggle to 
reconcile the legitimacy of nationalism against the spectres of racism, xenophobia and 
ethnocentrism (Condor, 2000). In this paper I consider the ways in which UK Labour 
Party ministers attend to the moral accountability (cf. Jayyusi. 1984) of the construct 
of ‘British society’ in relation to the distinction between ‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ forms of 
nationalism.  
 Although the distinction between ethnic and civic constructions of national 
identity or citizenship1 is widely invoked in meta-representational discourse, in 
practice there exists no consensus concerning what, in fact, constitute the defining 
features of either of the key terms (Eriksen, 1993; Thomas, 1999).  For example, 
within the frame of reference of ‘assimilationist’ models of citizenship (of which 
public discourses in France are often taken to represent an exemplary case, see 
Bryant, 1997; Favell, 1998) the term ‘civic’ tends to be treated as synonymous with 
‘cultural’ and the construct of ‘ethnic’ nationalism is understood to refer to the 
application of ancestral (racial or genetic) criteria to determine citizenship. In 
contrast, ‘multiculturalist’ models (often seen to be exemplified by the official public 
philosophy of the UK) typically understand ‘civic’ nationalism to refer to situations in 
which citizenship is not contingent upon the adoption of any particular cultural 
practices. In this case, the construct ‘ethnic’ nationalism is understood to include 
                                                
1 Although the blanket term ‘national’ is often applied to representations of polities and societies, in 
fact it is relatively unusual for the boundaries of nations, states and civil societies to coincide (Walby, 
2003).  In the UK context, the use of the terms ‘nationality’, ‘national identity’ and ‘nationalism’ are 
especially problematic, since the British state in fact constitutes a multi-national polity (McCrone & 
Kiely, 2000). However, in the interests of simplicity of presentation, I shall refer to representations of 
Britain and Britishness as ‘national’ when no alternative term is readily available (e.g. ‘nationalism’, 
‘nationalization’) or when a commentator to whom I am referring adopts this formulation. 
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situations in which citizenship status is contingent upon the adoption of the cultural 
practices of the ‘host’ society (Kymlicka, 1995; cf. Alexander, 2002; Barker, 1981) 2.  
 However defined, it is common for commentators to treat different 
constructions of citizenship as ‘rival’ versions (Máiz, 2003). This kind of presumption 
has led to forms of empirical research that attempt to classify both state bureaucracies 
and individual citizens in terms of their endorsement of particular criteria for the 
ascription of national identity or citizenship. A recent example from the UK may be 
found in Tilley, Exley & Heath’s (2004) analysis of responses to the British Social 
Attitudes Survey with a view to measuring the extent to which individual respondents 
endorse civic or ethnic criteria for ‘being British’. An alternative kind of research 
strategy, exemplified in research by Kiely, Bechhofer and McCrone (2005), eschews 
the ambiguous labels, ‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’, but focuses instead on the ways in which 
social actors ascribe nationality to self and to others on the basis of criteria of birth, 
ancestry or commitment to country. 
 In this paper, I shall argue that the procedure of classifying representations of 
nationality or citizenship into distinct types runs the risk of underestimating the 
complexities (cf. Bergman, 1999) and the dilemmatic properties (Billig, 1988; Billig, 
1993; Billig et al., 1997; Markova, 2000; Moloney & Walker, 2002) of social and 
political representation. In the following pages I present a case study of political 
arguments in favour of multicultural constructions of ‘British identity’, illustrating 
how a social representations perspective may draw attention to ambivalences within 
mediated images of the societal status quo and utopian visions concerning future 
                                                
2 Although it has become conventional to automatically equate the construct of ‘ethnic’ nationalism 
with ‘exclusiveness’, this formulation is also open to debate. In particular, we may note that Morris 
(1996) argued that ‘cultures of descent’ have the potential to be inherently pluralistic in so far as 
membership does not depend on the acceptance on the part of an individual of a common set of 
practices or institutions but is ‘vouchsafed by ancestry alone’. 
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possibilities (Moloney, Hall & Walker, 2005; Moscovici, 1988). The position I shall 
be adopting can be best summarised by a quotation from Rose, Efraim, Gervais, Joffe, 
Jovchelovitch & Morant (1995, p. 4): 
 ‘Against notions of monolithic and homogenous representations, we propose 
 the idea of a representational field, susceptible to contradiction, fragmentation, 
 negotiation and debate. In such a representational field, there is incoherence, 
 tension and ambivalence. Yet, permeating all these disparate elements there is 
 a consensual reality, which forms the common ground of historically shared 
 meanings within which people discuss and negotiate’. 
Specifically, I shall consider how publicised political speeches in favour of non-
racialized, multicultural constructions of British society and identity contain within 
them elements of incoherence, tension and ambivalence, which are traceable to the 
fact that the speakers formulate their arguments within a taken for granted frame of 
reference which Billig (1995) has termed ‘banal nationalism’. This involves the 
unquestioned, common-sense presumption that that the proper unit for social concern 
and moral accountability – whether economic, legal or ethical – involves the nation or 
state; that nations and states exist in essentially competitive relationships with each 
other, and that nations are normally populated by an original folk who possess a 
common racial heritage and a distinctive set of cultural practices. 
 
British identity as an essentially contested construct 
 In Banal Nationalism, Billig (1995) argued that appeals to British identity 
apparent in media and political rhetoric illustrated the status of British society as ‘a 
topos beyond argumentation’.  However, whilst some commentators may on occasion 
represent the British population as endorsing a consensual ‘public opinion’ with 
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respect to this issue (cf. Bourdieu, 1971/93), in practice the meaning and legitimacy 
of the category ‘British’ has always constituted the subject of social and political 
contestation (Cohen, 1994; Samuel, 1998). Rather than constituting an unambiguous 
category of discourse, the term ‘British’ might rather be understood to constitute what 
Gallie (1956) has termed an ‘essentially contested construct’, characterised by 
irresolvable disputes about its proper use, which are not settled by ‘appeal to 
empirical evidence, linguistic usage, or the canons of logic alone’ (Gray 1977, p. 
344).  
 Contemporary cultural theorists regularly distinguish two competing versions 
of British identity, reflecting the distinction between ethno-cultural and civic 
representations of societies and polities discussed above: 
 One is Anglo-centric, frequently conservative, backward-looking, and 
 increasingly located in a frozen and largely stereotyped idea of the national 
 culture. The other is ex-centric, open-ended, and multi—ethnic. (Chambers, 
 1989 p. 94). 
Explicit public and media debates concerning the nature of British identity surface in 
the context of a range of political issues, including matters relating to UK 
constitutional change and to EU integration. However, some of the most common 
arguments concern the construction of British identity and society in relation to 
immigration, race relations and multiculturalism (e.g. Alibhai Brown, 2000; Parekh 
2000a;b, see Condor, Gibson & Abell, 2006; Fortier, 2005). These popular debates 
are, in turn, regularly responded to by government ministers who promote a preferred 
form of societal representation.  It is common on the part of the liberal left to attribute 
ethno-racial understandings of British society to supporters of the Conservative party 
(see the quotation for Chambers above for an example). However, although both 
8 
individual ministers and the main political parties may adopt distinctive positions 
concerning race, immigration and (multi)culture, there nevertheless exists what Favell 
(1998) has termed a general ‘consensual logic’ (p. 103) on the part of the UK political 
establishment against explicitly racial or cultural definitions of British identity and 
citizenship. More generally, a normative value of multiculturalism may be understood 
as ‘consensual’ in so far as it is recognized, if not always personally endorsed, by 
members of the general public (cf. Devine & Elliot, 1995). 
Some widely-publicized political pronouncements concerning the ways in 
which Britishness should be understood in relation to matters of race, faith and culture 
have been formulated in response to an immediate ‘crisis’ such as the ‘race riots’ (a 
series of civil disturbances between young men of white and Pakistani/Bangladeshi 
ethnic heritage) in the summer of 2001, and more recently, the London bombings of 
2005. For present purposes, however, I shall focus on more routine forms of political 
rhetoric. The objective is to show how, even in apparently straightforward cases, 
appeals to the fact and value of Britain as a ‘multicultural society’ may in practice be 
characterised by contradictions, ironies and paradoxes. 
 
The data 
 For illustrative purposes I shall be considering two political speeches 
delivered by UK Labour Party ministers in the first quarter of 2001. The first speech 
was delivered in February by Keith Vaz, an Indian-born MP, who was at the time was 
FCO Minister of State. This speech was entitled, ‘Citizenship, identity and ethnicity in 
Britain and Europe’, and was presented at the Diplomatic Academy, Vienna. The 
second speech was delivered two months later by Robin Cook, a Scottish Labour MP 
representing the seat of Livingston, who was at the time Foreign Secretary. This 
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speech, entitled ‘British Identity’, was presented to the Centre for the Open Society in 
London. These two speeches were targeted at different audiences and consequently 
focussed on rather different issues. However, the ways in which the speakers 
constructed arguments against ethnic, and in favour of multicultural, representations 
of British society and citizenship shared many features in common, and for present 
purposes we may deal with them together without any significant loss of information. 
    
Representing ethno-cultural constructions of British society 
 
 
 The first thing to note is that (pace Billig) in neither of these speeches did Vaz 
or Cook presuppose that the constructs of British society and British identity 
represented topi beyond argumentation. On the contrary, both speakers adopted a 
polemical (cf. Moscovici, 1988) stance, defining their own (and by extension their 
party’s and the government’s) commitment to multiculturalism precisely in opposition 
to alternative available constructions of British identity. In so doing, both speakers 
invoked the kind of representational scheme used by Chambers in the quotation 
presented on page 6.  Mono-cultural understandings of British identity were construed 
as one component of an ideological cluster that also included racism, Anglocentrism, 
xenophobia, Imperialism and political opposition to the EU. In contrast, multicultural 
understandings of British identity were treated as a component of a cluster of values 
that also included anti-racism, internationalism and support for the EU. This form of 
representational clustering allowed the speakers to attribute opposition to a range of 
10 
current government policies – including immigration, multiculturalism, devolution 
and EU integration - to a single underlying motive: ‘insular nationalism’3.  
 
Ethno-cultural constructions of British identity as a form of personal attitude  
 In the course of their speeches, both Vaz and Cook invoked images of a public 
sphere inhabited by individuals who currently endorse different points of view 
concerning the value of multiculturalism. For example, Vaz contrasted his own (and 
the ‘British Government’s’) preferred version with the views of ‘some’ people: 
Extract 1 
 
KV 1 On the issue of identity, there has been quite a bit of debate in Britain  
 2 about just what it means to be British. It is clear that the term embraces 
 3 different things for different people. For some, it is a narrow term   
 4 suggesting white, English and Empire – thus excluding millions of British 
 5 citizens. For others, it conveys a much  wider range of images reflecting 
 6 the whole of our society… 
 
 Billig (1989) has identified two different ways in which individuals may be 
understood to ‘hold a view’.  The first, which he terms the ‘multi-subjective’ position, 
treats an individual’s (or group’s) views as expressions of differing, and possibly 
idiosyncratic, subjective positions.   The second form of representation, which Billig 
terms ‘intersubjectivity’, presents ‘views’ as pertaining to a singular, and ultimately 
discernable empirical reality, such that agreement amongst perceivers is both possible 
and ideally desirable.  
 In the case of the stretch of talk presented in extract 1, we may note that 
although Vaz apparently displays an even-handed approach to differences of opinion 
concerning ‘what it means to be British’, at the outset of his speech he made it clear 
that the multicultural position did not simply represent one point of view amongst 
                                                
3 Note how this formulation implicitly elides the possibility of the EU being resisted on any grounds 
other than narrow-minded national parochialism, such as political opposition to capitalism, or 
commitment to cosmopolitanism (cf. Condor, Gibson & Abell, 2006; Reicher, 1997). 
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many, but rather represented the only position which adequately reflected the 
objective facts of contemporary social reality: 
Extract  2 
 
KV 1 The first point I would like to get across is that Britain is without   
 2 doubt a multicultural society.  
 
  Robin Cook similarly  referred to a non-specific ‘some people’ who assume 
‘the homogeneity of British identity … to be the norm’ (see extract 9, line 2, below), 
but presented the multicultural alternative as a project that the British people need to 
‘come to terms with’, not simply because it more accurately reflected the nature of 
British society, but also for pragmatic reasons: 
Extract  3 
 
RC 1 Coming to terms with multiculturalism as a positive force for our   
 2 economy and society will have significant implications for our   
 3 understanding of Britishness 
 
 
 The construction of multi- versus mono-cultural constructions of British 
identity as essentially different points of view may also be seen to bear upon two 
divergent conceptions of ‘public opinion’ (see Condor & Gibson, in press). On the 
one hand, the emotional force and partiality of ‘mere’ public opinion may be 
contrasted with cool rationality of expertise. In this case, public opinion may be 
treated as an object of governance: a position which Cook and Vaz implicitly adopted 
when they presented pragmatic arguments in favour of the public ‘coming to terms 
with’ multiculturalism.  On the other hand, public opinion may be treated as mandate 
for political action. Writing during the second world war, the pioneers of modern 
opinion polling techniques Gallop and Rae (1940) suggested that an approach which 
treated the public as the ultimate authority represented the key features of democratic 
governance: ‘the thesis that the people … must be led by … legislators and the 
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experts … differs only in degree, and not in essence, from the view urged by 
Mussolini and Hitler that the people are mere  “ballot cattle”…’ (p. 259).  
 In so far as Vaz and Cook acknowledged that policies of multiculturalism 
would not necessarily be endorsed by all members of the British public, this 
necessarily raised questions of democratic accountability. Consequently, at the same 
time as they acknowledged that ‘some’ members of the British population would not 
agree with their support for multiculturalism, Vaz and Cook also sought to establish 
the potential for its widespread endorsement by presenting the acceptance of cultural 
pluralism as essentially compatible with shared British ‘ideals’ and ‘values’: 
Extract  4 
 
KV 1 underpinning the word [British] must be a shared understanding   
 2 of core British values such as respect for human rights, tolerance,   
 3 fair play, creativity and an outward approach to the world. This is  
 4 essential to maintain a cohesive and stable society. In general there  
 5 are few conflicts between sharing these values and accepting cultural  
 6 differences. 
 
With respect to my earlier comment concerning the ways in which Vaz and Cook 
represented ethno-cultural understandings of British society as part of a set of 
attitudes which also included insular nationalism, we may note how, in extract 4, Vaz 
presents these ‘core British values’ (line 2) not only as compatible with the 
acceptance of the fact and value of domestic ‘cultural differences’ (lines 5-6), but also 
as synonymous with ‘an outward approach to the world’ (line 3). 
 In extract 5, Robin Cook employs a slightly different form of argument, in 
which unspecified shared ‘British values’ (line 1) are treated as causal factors behind 
the existence of Britain as a ‘successful multi-ethnic society’ (line 2):  
Extract  5 
 
RC  1 We should be proud that those British values have made Britain   
 2 a successful multi-ethnic society. We should welcome that   
 3 pluralism as a unique asset for Britain in a modern world where   
 4 our prosperity, our security and our influence depend on the health   
 5 of our relations with other peoples around the globe. 
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Once again we can see how ‘British values’ are associated not only with the 
endorsement of multiculturalism in the domestic arena, but also with a concern over, 
‘our relations with other peoples around the globe’ (line 5). 
 
Ethno-cultural constructions of British society as historical anachronism  
 A good deal of work in the social representations tradition has considered the 
role of historiography in national representation (Condor, 1997a; Condor and Abell, 
2006; Liu & Hilton, 2005; Liu, Lawrence, Ward & Abraham, 2002; Liu, Wilson, 
McClure & Higgins, 1999; Soares & Jesuíno, 2004). One recent study has drawn 
attention to the ways in which ordinary social actors in England may be inclined to 
evaluate their country using historical (then-now) as opposed to explicitly 
international (us-them) comparisons (Condor, in press, see Brown & Haeger, 1999 for 
an account of the distinction between temporal and international comparison 
processes).  In the political speeches considered here, both of the speakers used a 
trope commonly employed by Condor’s (in press) lay respondents, in which the fact 
of polyculture and the value of multiculturalism are represented as contemporary and 
progressive, whereas the nation-past is understood to have been characterized by a 
condition of cultural homogeneity (see Samuel, 1989 for a critique).   
 In the course of promoting multicultural understandings of British identity, 
Vaz argued that this form of representation more accurately reflects contemporary, 
post-imperial, political realities than alternative more exclusive formulations:  
Extract  6 
 
KV 1 the term ‘British’ is not a static one but one that has to take   
 2 account of the changes in our society over the last thirty years,   
 3 including devolution, globalisation, the end of Empire and   
 4 Britain’s much closer involvement in Europe. It needs to include   




Robin Cook similarly treated ethno-cultural constructions as antithetical to a ‘modern 
notion of national identity’: 
Extract  7 
 
RC 1 The modern notion of national identity cannot be based on race and   
 2 ethnicity, but must be based on shared ideals and aspirations. Some 
 3 of the most successful countries in the modern world, such as the United 
 4 States and Canada, are immigrant societies. Their experience shows 
 5 how cultural diversity, allied to a shared concept of equal citizenship, can 
 6 be a source of enormous strength.  
 
At the same time, however, Cook also argued that representations of an indigenous 
British race or culture had never, in fact, been valid:  
Extract  8 
 
RC 1 The idea that Britain was a ‘pure’ Anglo-Saxon society before the arrival of 
 2 communities from the Caribbean, Asia and Africa is fantasy. But if 
 3 this view of British identity is false to our past, it is false to our future too. 
 4 The global era has produced population movements of a breadth and   
 5 richness without parallel in history.  
 
Towards the end of his speech, Cook attempted to manage this potential contradiction 
by arguing that mono-cultural representations of Britishness had only been valid 
‘from the Victorian era of imperial expansion to the aftermath of the Second World 
War’ (extract 9, lines 3-4), a period which he effectively bracketed from the longue 
duree of British history by treating this as an ‘extraordinary’ moment4: 
Extract  9 
 
RC  1 In our thousand years of history, the homogeneity of British   
 2 identity that some people assume to be the norm was confined to a   
 3 relatively brief period. It lasted from the Victorian era of imperial   
 4 expansion to the aftermath of the Second World War and depended   
 5 on the unifying force of those two extraordinary experiences. The   
 6 diversity of modern Britain expressed through devolution and   
 7 multiculturalism is more consistent with the historical experience   
 8 of our islands. 
 
 
                                                
4 For present purposes I am largely bracketing consideration of the provenance of the individual 
speakers. However, it is interesting to note that this kind of historical periodisation, whereby the age of 
empire and the second world war are separated off from the otherwise ongoing flow of history tends to 
be more common among speakers from Scotland than England (Condor & Abell, 2006).  
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 In addition to presenting anti-racism and multiculturalism as a political 
projects which had been rendered timely and expedient by historically novel 
processes and events, or which was consistent with the unfolding trajectory of British 
history, both Vaz and Cook also presented ethnic diversity as an extant and 
prospective future accomplishment of Labour government policies. Vaz, who was 
addressing a conference on citizenship, emphasized how the active protection and 
promotion of cultural and racial diversity represented a form of moral imperative, 
driven primarily over concerns of social justice and citizen welfare:  
Extract  10 
 
KV 1 The British Government’s policies on multiculturalism are clear. We   
 2 see strength and enrichment in diversity. And we believe that one   
 3 of the greatest responsibilities we have is to try to make Britain a   
 4 fairer place; a place where people of every race and religion feel   
 5 themselves to be an equal part of the whole; a society which   
 6 makes a celebration out of the fact that we are multi-cultural,   
 7 multi-religious and multi-racial; one which not just assimilates   
 8 people but celebrates people’s differences. 
 
Cook, who was addressing a group of business people, presented the multicultural 
project as dictated less by moral and civic concerns as by economic and military 
imperatives, ‘our prosperity, our security and our influence’ (extract 5, lines 4 and 5) 
(cf. Hay & Rosamond, 2002). 
 
Resisting ethno-cultural representations of British society 
 
 One especially notable feature of the two speeches considered here is the 
absence of appeals to any substantive notion of British culture. Although both 
speakers referred to a shared British ‘society’ or ‘values’, precisely what these might 
consist of was never made clear. Neither of the speakers alluded to a shared British 
character (cf. Chambers, 1989). Although analyses of political and media discourse 
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have treated appeals to national ‘character’ and ‘identity’ as functionally equivalent 
(e.g. Billig, 1995; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), it is notable that in these particular 
speeches the term ‘identity’ was typically used as a rhetorical substitute for references 
to substantive culture or character.  
 
Strategies of objectification and anchoring 
 Rather than reify the construct of Britishness through allusions to a common 
and enduring national character or culture, Vaz and Cook used three alternative 
rhetorical strategies by which to render images of a polycultural British society, and 
multiculturalism as a socio-political process, concrete and visible.  
 First, both Vaz and Cook regularly slipped between the language of polity and 
the idiom of geography, re-presenting ‘British society’ in non-social terms, as  ‘the 
island/s’ (cf. Abell et al., 2006). For example, Vaz (see extract 13, below), elided the 
constructs of ‘British society’ and ‘island status’, and Cook (see extract 9, above) 
employed anthropomorphic imagery to attribute enduring historical experience not to 
the British people but British territory: ‘The diversity of modern Britain expressed 
through devolution and multiculturalism is more consistent with the historical 
experience of our islands’5. 
 The second strategy used in both speeches involved objectifying the construct 
of ‘culture/s’ through culinary imagery. The capacity for abstract constructs and 
values to be conveyed through images of food has been documented in other contexts 
                                                
5 Vaz’s use of the singular ‘island’ and Cook’s use of the plural ‘islands’ parallels differences in 
formulation in England and Scotland noted by Abell et al (2006). The complexities and contradictions 
which run through political arguments are also evidenced at the more basic level of lexical choice: the 
singular ‘island’ may be regarded as problematic since it omits part of the territory of the UK state. On 
the other hand, the plural ‘our islands’ may be regarded as overly-inclusive, in so far as it is often used 
by people in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as a reference to the geographical region of 
the British Isles as opposed to the territory of the UK state. Note also how the BNP – who generally 
espouse an ideology of national integrity and support policies of intra-UK national self-governance – 
also use the plural form of ‘these islands’ (see extracts 17 and 18). 
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(e.g. Jovchelovitch & Gervais, 1999), as has the specific use of culinary imagery in 
the context of accounts of British multiculturalism  (Cook, Crang, & Thorpe, 1999). 
In extract 1, we saw Keith Vaz argue in favour of a racially and culturally inclusive 
version of Britishness. In the course of working up this account, Vaz switched from 
using the term ‘British’ as a social or political referent (a ‘society’ of ‘citizens’) to 




 3       For some, it is a narrow  
 4 term suggesting white, English and Empire – thus excluding millions of 
 5 British citizens. For others, it conveys a much wider range of images   
 6 reflecting the whole of our society – not just fish and chips, but also sweet 
 7 and sour pork and chicken tikka masala. In fact, the last dish was   
 8  actually invented in Britain by Indian restaurateurs, but I digress! 
 
Two months later Cook took up Vaz’s ‘digressive’ narrative concerning chicken tikka 
masala and raised it to exemplificatory status6:  
Extract 12 
 
RC  1 Chicken Tikka Masala is now a true British national dish, not   
 2 only because it is the most popular, but because it is a perfect   
 3 illustration of the way Britain absorbs and adapts external   
 4 influences. Chicken Tikka is an Indian dish. The Masala sauce   
 5 was added to satisfy the desire of British people to have their meat   
 6 served in gravy. 
 
 The third strategy involved the use of a highly conventionalised (cf. Bartlett, 
1932) form of historiography as an anchoring device for accounts of contemporary 
British multiculturalism. Anglo British historiography tends not to employ foundation 
myths, but rather involves a narrative of successive ‘waves’ of foreign invasion and 
settlement (Condor, in press). Both Vaz and Cook used this form of historical 
                                                
6 Somewhat parenthetically, we may note that this example reminds us of the potential dangers inherent 
in assuming that ‘the media’ speak with a singular voice (cf. Moscovici, 1976). In the present case, 
Vaz’s original reference to chicken tikka masala appears to have been simply ignored by the news 
media. Cook’s recycling of chicken tikka as a metaphor for British cultural hybridity, on the other 
hand, was widely reported – and generally ridiculed - in the media in England. In Scotland, media 
emphasis was more inclined to be placed on the question of whether chicken tikka masala could be 
claimed as a distinctively Scottish invention (Rosie et al., 2004). 
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representation to normalise post-colonial immigration. In extract 13, Vaz describes 
the ongoing process by which ‘British society’ (unlike that of his Austrian hosts) 
developed into a ‘nation of island people from diverse origins’ (lines 3-4): 
Extract 13 
 
KV 1 British society, on the other hand, has been deeply marked by its island 
 2 status of four nations and its history of an overseas rather than a   
 3 continental empire. It has always been a nation of island people from   
 4  diverse origins - by 1066, when we were invaded for the last time by the 
 5 Normans, we had already been subject to invasion and settlement by the 
 6 Romans, Angles, Saxons, Danes, Vikings, and Norse. Immigrants arrived in 
 7 significant numbers from Europe during the late 19th century and in the 
 8 first half of the last century. And after the war, we encouraged immigration 
 9 to Britain from our colonies and former colonies to help rebuild our   
 10 shattered economy. The first group of Jamaicans arrived in 1948 and were 
 11 followed by tens of thousands more, from the Caribbean, India, Pakistan 
 12 and Bangladesh. The 70s and 80s also saw the arrival of the Hong Kong  
 13 Chinese and refugees from Vietnam. 
 
Robin Cook also used this trope when he represented the present condition of racial 
heterogeneity and cultural pluralism as the most recent stage in the open-ended 
evolution of British identity, whereby people of ‘countless different races and 





RC 1 The first element in the debate about the future of Britishness is   
 2 the changing ethnic composition of the British people themselves.   
 3 The British are not a race, but a gathering of countless different   
 4 races and communities, the vast majority of which were not   
 5 indigenous to these islands. 
 
Later in his speech, he extemporised upon this theme: 
Extract 15 
 
RC  1 London was first established as the capital of a Celtic Britain by Romans 
 2 from Italy. They were in turn driven out by Saxons and Angles from   
 3 Germany. The great cathedrals of this land were built mostly by Norman 
 4 Bishops, but the religion practised in them was secured by the succession 
 5 of a Dutch Prince. Outside our Parliament, Richard the Lionheart proudly 
 6  sits astride his steed. A symbol of British courage and defiance. Yet he  
 7  spoke French much of his life and depended on the Jewish community of 
 8  England to put up the ransom that freed him from prison. 
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The implicit attribution of intra-national racial and cultural diversity to the process of 
transnational immigration, evident in both of these speeches (see also extracts 7 and 
8), has important ideological implications, which will be discussed presently. 
 
The common-place status of the ‘waves of foreign influence’ repertoire 
  In the next section of this paper I shall be considering some of the tensions, 
oppositional themes and paradoxes that may be identified within these arguments in 
favour of non-racialized and culturally plural representations of British society. 
Before we move on, however, it is worth noting elements of consensus between 
arguments designed for very different political ends.  
 The notion of ‘consensus’ in social representations theory has, of course, been 
the subject of a good deal of dispute, with discursive psychologists in particular 
taking issue with what they understand either to be a claim to the effect that members 
of a particular group or society will simply agree in their understandings and 
evaluations of the social and physical world (e.g. Potter & Litton, 1985), or that 
representations will only be employed in the form of fixed and distinctive opinions, 
‘in the sense that some people [will] always use a certain repertoire, and certain 
people another’ (Potter & Wetherell, 1987 p. 156). Taking issue with this kind of 
interpretation, Rose et al. (1995) emphasised that the term ‘consensual’ should be 
understood more loosely, as reference to a ‘representational field’ that provides social 
actors with a shared stock of symbolic resources and common grounds for debate. In 
this respect, the notion of a ‘consensual’ representation might be seen to be essentially 
compatible with Billig’s (1987; 1991) notion of ‘common-place’ aspects of 
argumentation, Potter & Wetherell’s (1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) construct of 
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shared ‘interpretative repertoires’, or ethnomethodological accounts of members of a 
collectivity orienting to shared ‘common-sense’ (e.g. Garfinkel & Sacks, 1970).   
 Previous work in social psychology has questioned whether people espousing 
different political views on matters of ‘race relations’ and multiculturalism will 
necessarily draw on different rhetorical and ideological resources. Rather, research 
has pointed to the ways in which the same basic values and propositions (albeit 
possibly understood in slightly different ways) may be used to construct both racist 
and anti-racist arguments (Verkuyten de Jong & Masson, 1994). In the case of the 
speeches considered here, we may note that although both Vaz and Cook relied 
heavily on the narrative device of progressive waves of foreign influence to 
undermine claims concerning the ethnic basis of British identity and to naturalise the 
status of contemporary Britain as a ‘multi-cultural society’, precisely the same form 
of historical imagery is currently employed by the far right British National Party 
(BNP) for very different rhetorical ends. The kinds of representation favoured by the 
BNP might be seen to epitomise precisely the ‘point of view’ that Vaz and Cook were 
resisting, in so far as they endorse an explicitly racial version of nationality and 
citizenship, as reflected in the following quotation from a speech (entitled ‘the Reality 
of Race’) presented by Nick Griffin, BNP chairman, published ahead of the UK local 
elections in 2003:  
Extract 16 
1  Mankind is divided into races, and those races, while sharing many common  
2  features of humanity, are innately different in many ways beyond mere colour. 
3   […] The most important first consequence of our acceptance of innate human  
4   differences is our recognition that nationality, while it is influenced by many  
5   factors including shared loyalties, common history, religious heritage and  
6   personal identification is first and foremost decided by ethnicity.  
 
It is interesting to note that the commonsensical nature of the narrative of ‘waves of 
foreign influence’ is such that even BNP spokespeople are unable to presume the 
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existence of ‘indigenous’ or ‘native’ British peoples as a primordial folk. Rather, in 
order to construct a category of persons rightfully belonging to the territorial area 
currently occupied by the UK state (or any of its constituent nations), the BNP 
substitute references to historical origins of the British people, with a notion of ‘deep’ 
historical legacy combined with a notion of Caucasian7 Western Europeans as 
‘kindred peoples’ (extract 17, line 7) of ‘almost identical stock’ (extract 18, line 7):  
Extract  17 
 
1 The British National Party exists to secure a future for the     
2 indigenous peoples of these islands in the North Atlantic which have  
3 been our homeland for millennia. We use the term indigenous to  
4 describe the people whose ancestors were the earliest settlers here  
5 after the last great Ice Age and which have been complemented by the historic  
6 migrations from mainland Europe. The migrations of the Celts, Anglo-Saxons,  
7 Danes, Norse and closely related kindred peoples have been, over the past few  
8 thousands years, instrumental in defining the character of our family of nations. 
 
BNP Mission Statement (http://www.bnp.org.uk/mission.htm). 
 
Extract 18 
1 Q: When you talk about being "British" what do you mean?  
2 A: We mean the bonds of culture, race, identity and roots of the native British       
3 peoples of the British Isles. We have lived in these islands near on 40,000 years!  
4  We were made by these islands, and these islands are our home. When we in the 
5  BNP talk about being British, we talk about the native peoples who have lived in    
6  these islands since before the Stone Age, and the relatively small numbers of       
7  peoples of almost identical stock, such as the Saxons, Vikings and Normans, and  
8  the Irish, who have come here and assimilated.  
BNP website FAQs (http://www.bnp.org.uk). 
 The presumption that British culture in general, and British democratic values8 
in particular, represent the distinctive historical product of ‘the peoples of Western 
                                                
7 The fact that the ‘kindred’ nature of the Celts, Anglo-Saxons, Danes, Norse, Romans and Normans 
pertains to their common racial ‘stock’ is spelled out in an article which clarifies the claim that the 
indigenous British constitute a collectivity of Caucasian peoples originating in Northern and Western 
Europe. See http://www.bnp.org.uk/articles/british_mongrel.htm 
 
8 It is a common feature of discourse that eschews cultural nationalism to distinguish between the 
constructs of ‘culture’ and ‘political values’, the claim being that citizens may maintain different ways 
of life whilst nevertheless subscribing to the same political institutions (see extracts KV4 and RC5 for 
examples of Vaz and Cook treating ‘values’ as distinct from ‘culture’). In contrast, it may be noted 
how BNP commentators treat political values as indistinguishable from culture, and regard both as 
largely determined by race. 
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Europe’ (extract 19, line 3) is used by the BNP as a basis for resisting further 
immigration by ‘people from very different ethnic groups and cultures’ (extract 19, 
lines 9-10), on the grounds that these people have ‘genetically pre-determined’ 
(extract 19, line 6) limitations to their ability to accommodate ‘European’ values of 
democratic citizenship:  
Extract 19 
1 Taking these facts into account, we believe that it is far more likely than not that  
2 the historically established tendency (and we do not claim that it is any more than 
3  that) of the peoples of Western Europe in general - and of these islands in            
4  particular - to create and sustain social and political structures in which individual 
5  freedom, equality before the law, private property and popular participation in      
6  decision-making, is to some extent at least genetically pre-determined. Such        
7  tendencies would, naturally, both shape our culture around such institutions, and  
8  in turn tend to be reinforced by that culture. 
9 If this is the case, then the idea that it is possible to allow large numbers of people 
10  from very different ethnic groups and cultures to settle here, on the assumption  
11 that it is just something about our bracing sea air that tends to make us natural  
12  born democrats, is fatally flawed. Just as is the idea that we can export our        
13  enthusiasm for representative government to other peoples, either by example or 
14  by carpet-bombing their countries into giving up their penchant for strong           
15  government or theocracy. 
16 Hence, in order to guarantee the continued existence of our British democracy, we 
17  also intend to take long-term steps to guarantee the continued existence, as the 
18  clearly dominant ethnic, cultural and political group, of the native peoples of these 
19  islands – the English, Scots, Irish and Welsh – together with the limited numbers 
20  of peoples of European descent, who arrived as refugees or economic immigrants 
21  centuries or decades ago, and who have fully integrated into our society.  
 




Reproducing the myth of ethnic nationalism 
 
 In this section of the paper I turn to consider some paradoxical aspects of 
Vaz’s and Cook’s accounts of Britain as a post-Imperial multicultural society and 
polity, and of their representation of multiculturalism as the antithesis of ‘insular 
nationalism’.  First, I consider how the specific arguments that Vaz and Cook 
mobilise to challenge mono-racial and mono-cultural constructions of British identity 
rely at base on a tacit presumption of a natural order of ethno-cultural nationhood. 
Second, I note how both speakers implicitly adopt a circumscribed understanding of 
their moral universe as pertaining simply to the UK. Third, I note how their resistance 
to racialization and their advocacy of multiculturalism in the domestic arena is 
articulated in conjunction with a form of subtle xenophobia, by virtue of which ethnic 
diversity is presented as a distinctively British virtue, and as a form of human capital 
that provides the UK with a competitive advantage over other nations and states. 
Finally, I note how these supposedly post-colonial re-formulations of British society 
as composed of diverse peoples inhabiting an enduring territory (‘the island’), whose 
distinctive history and geographical location makes them especially disinclined 
towards insularity, and who enjoy the material, aesthetic and moral advantages of a 
multi-racial, multicultural polity, paradoxically echo the very discursive formations of 
Anglo British identity and imperial governance which the speakers claim to be 
supplanting. 
 
Presupposing a global order of ethnic nationhood  
 In the course of resisting ethno-cultural representations of British society, 
neither Vaz nor Cook questioned the presumption that nations in general are normally 
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populated by an original, singular and distinctive folk. The closest that either of these 
speakers comes to rejecting ethno-cultural nationalism as a general ideological 
principle is when Cook (extract 7) casts the USA and Canada as examples of 
‘modern’ nations. This one exception aside, the rhetorical devices that Vaz and Cook 
used to promote the fact and value of British multiculturalism actually presupposed a 
natural order in which nations are populated by an original folk possessing a common 
ancestral heritage and a homogeneous and distinctive culture. In fact, their claims 
concerning the importance of non-ethnic understandings of nationhood for the 
‘modern world’ implicitly presuppose a ‘pre-modern world’ for which ethnic 
formulations would have been appropriate.  
 In addition, we may note how the attribution of intra-national and intra-state 
racial and cultural pluralism to ‘external influence’ (extract 20 line 3) in general, and 
to trans-national immigration in particular, implicitly excludes consideration of 
indigenous cultural heterogeneity within the territories of extant or historically 
emergent nations or states. Neither Cook nor Vaz entertained the possibility that the 
inhabitants of the British Isles (or, in extract 7, of Canada or the USA) might have 
been characterised by ethnic diversity before the waves of ‘foreigners’ arrived at the 
shores. Similarly, they did not entertain the possibility that the peoples that they cite 
as cultural brokers (Saxons, Danes, Vikings, Norse etc.) might themselves have been 
characterised by various, or hybrid, cultural forms. Finally, the presumption that 
different cultures were originally the property of distinctive national peoples 
inhabiting national territories is apparent in the anachronistic application of 
contemporary frames of geopolitical reference, whereby imperial Rome is located in 
‘Italy’, and the Angles are said to hail from ‘Germany’ (extract 15). 
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British multiculturalism and subtle xenophobia 
 We have seen how both Cook and Vaz suggested that anti-racism and 
multiculturalism necessarily entail a commitment to internationalism and vice versa, 
thereby presenting themselves (and the party and government they represented) as 
inhabiting what Billig (1995 p. 49) termed a ‘reasonable world of point-zero 
nationalism’. However, as Billig (1995) cogently noted, the construct of inter-
nationalism in fact presupposes a world which is ultimately decomposable into 
essentially and eternally separate national categories. In practice, the wider world in 
which Vaz and Cook located the UK was not a world of universal humanity, nor a 
cosmopolitan world of trans-national cultures, nor again a global ‘network’ through 
which flows of people, capital, ideologies, practices, artefacts or cultural formations 
may be charted (cf. Urry, 2000). Rather, both speakers represented Britain as a 
coherent and bounded nation/state within a world in which economies, societies, 
virtues, interests and (normally) races and cultures, all come neatly and 
unambiguously packaged in national (or state) categories. Their arguments in favour 
of UK multiculturalism did not challenge what Billig has identified as the hegemonic 
status of nationalism as an ‘international ideology’. On the contrary, their arguments 
actually promoted the value of British exceptionalism, and promoted the UK’s 
particular economic and military interests in direct contrast to those of other nations 
and states. 
  
(i) Ethnic diversity and British exceptionalism 
 As we noted above, the arguments that Cook and Vaz formulated in favour of 
the poly-ethnic character of British society did not rest on claims to the effect that the 
ideology of ethnic nationalism per se is based on false premises. On the contrary, the 
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crux of these arguments was that ideologies of cultural and racial purity are false 




RC  1 In the pre-industrial era, when transport and communications were   
 2 often easier by sea than by land, Britain was unusually open to   
 3 external influence; first through foreign invasion, then, after Britain   
 4 achieved naval supremacy, through commerce and imperial  
 5 expansion. It is not their purity that makes the British unique, but   
 6 the sheer pluralism of their ancestry. 
 
 
This extract is particularly interesting in view of the fact that Cook had earlier 
justified the UK’s membership of the EU on the grounds of the existence of a 
common ‘European identity’ based on shared geography and history: 
Extract  21 
 
RC 1 To deny that Britain is European is to deny both our geography and our 
 2 history. Our culture, our security, and our prosperity, are inseparable 
 3 from the continent of Europe. 
 
In extract 20, however, the idea that ‘Britain’ (here equated with the territory of the 
contemporary UK state) had, in the past, been ‘uniquely open to external influence’ 
involves a sense of absolute geographical distinctiveness, together with a strategic 
bracketing of historical population flows throughout Europe as well as elsewhere 
across the globe (see extract 22 below, for a similar account from Vaz’s speech). 
Similarly, in extract 13, we may note how Keith Vaz neglects to consider the non-
continental imperial histories of the Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese, and overlooks the 
Roman occupation of any other European (or, for that matter, Asian and African) 
territories. In contrast, the BNP’s explicitly racialized version of British identity is 
paradoxically more able to accommodate imagery of a pan-European experience 
based on a common geographical location and a common history.  
 More generally, we may note that far from entailing the antithesis of ‘insular 
nationalism’, Vaz and Cook’s arguments against racially or culturally delimited 
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understandings of social inclusion were strictly delimited in their domain of 
application to the population of the UK.  Consequently, when Vaz described to his 
audience in Vienna how ‘diversity enriches our society and our lives’ he was using 
‘our’ in an addressee-exclusive way, to pertain specifically to Britain.  Similarly, 
when Cook described multiculturalism as ‘a positive force for our economy and 
society’ (extract 3), the pronominal ‘our’ and the nominal ‘economy’ and ‘society’ did 
not refer to a generic category of humanity, or even to an imagined community of EU 
citizens, but to ‘our’ specifically British economy and society. And when Cook 
referred to the value of cultural pluralism for ‘our prosperity, our security’ (extract 5) 
this did not refer to ‘our’ global welfare, but specifically to the welfare of British 
residents or citizens.  If we refer back to extract 5, we can see that Cook completed 
his three part list (cf. Jefferson, 1990) with a reference to ‘our influence’, and 
constructed the relationship between the British citizenry and global humanity in 
terms of an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ distinction (‘our relations with other peoples around 
the globe’) in such a manner as to treat the rest of the world as a potential threat or 
resource rather than a category of common identity or interest9. 
 
(ii) Multiculturalism as a British resource and virtue 
 Cook and Vaz did not simply restrict their moral and pragmatic concerns to 
the welfare of population of the UK. In addition, their arguments in favour of 
multiculturalism involved an imaginary international hierarchy - an ‘order of nations’ 
(cf. Spurr, 2001) - in which the existence of ethnic diversity and political support for 
cultural pluralism in the UK was treated as evidence for ‘our’ distinctively advanced 
stage of politico-moral development and level of rational governance. Keith Vaz was 
                                                
9 The representation of emergent global events and processes as constraints and opportunities for 
specifically British interests and policies is common to New Labour rhetoric  (Smith, 2000). 
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addressing an audience in Vienna, and at the start of his speech he displayed a tactful 
concern to respect the different approaches adopted towards national integration 
adopted by governments in Austria and the UK:  
Extract 22 
 
KV  1 Austria’s approach to multiculturalism, given our different histories and 
 2 geographical positions, is different from ours. You tend to focus more on 
 3 integration in the sense of assimilation. But it would be strange if we   
 4  viewed these issues in the same way.  
   
Although Vaz attempted to deflect potential charges of ethnocentrism by casting 
ideological differences between the UK and Austria as natural and inevitable (‘it 
would be strange if we viewed these issues in the same way’, lines 3-4), at the same 
time he made it clear that the (multiculturalist) values he attributed to the British 
government are ultimately morally superior to those (assimilationist) policies he 
attributed to the Austrian government: in extract 10 we saw Vaz treating ‘fairness’ as 
necessarily entailing government policy that ‘not just assimilates people but 
celebrates people’s differences.’  Consequently, to paraphrase a formulation from 
Meertens & Pettigrew (1997 p. 56), whilst Vaz did not treat the Austrian approach to 
national integration as inferior to the British approach, he presented the British 
approach as superior to the Austrian. 
 Cook, who was addressing a domestic audience, cast cultural pluralism not 
simply as a matter of ‘our’ superior moral virtue, but also as a resource in an 
essentially competitive international arena: ‘an immense asset [for]…our nation’, and 
he enjoined his audience to appreciate the extent to which the existence of (by 
implication distinctive) ethnic diversity enhances the human capital of the Capital, 
such that London may be represented as the ‘hub of the globe’: 
Extract 23 
 
RC 1 Today’s London is a perfect hub of the globe. It is home to over 30 ethnic  
 2 communities of at least 10,000 residents each. In this city tonight, over 
 3 300 languages will be spoken by families over their evening meal at home. 
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 4 This pluralism is not a burden we must reluctantly accept. It is an immense 
 5 asset that contributes to the cultural and economic vitality 
           6          of our nation.  
 In addition, we may note how Vaz and Cook presented anti-racism, 
multiculturalism, internationalism and even democracy not as generic human values, 
but as specifically and distinctively British virtues: Vaz, for example, described 
‘respect for human rights’, ‘tolerance’, ‘fair play’ and ‘an outward approach to the 
world’ as ‘core British values’ (see extract 4). Again, it is interesting to note how the 
BNP version – in which respect for human rights, tolerance, fair play and so forth are 
attributed to the genetic propensity of Western European Caucasians – is 
paradoxically more open to the possibility that democratic values may not reflect 
uniquely British virtues.  
 
Echoes of Empire 
 As Moscovici (1981 p. 191) has noted, social representations create a 
‘reassuring impression of something we have “seen before” and “known before”’.  
What Cook and Vaz both left unacknowledged is the extent to which their supposedly 
novel forms re-presentation actually directly echoed (cf. Moscovici, 1984 p. 950) the 
dominant discursive tropes of Anglo British imperial governance. In fact, far from 
representing a distinctively post-colonial reformulation of nationhood and of British 
identity, parallel forms of representation may be identified quite readily in didactic 
texts produced for the British public from the Victorian era of Imperial expansion 
until the Second World War.  
 
(i) The trope of Anglo/British diversity and hybridity 
 I noted above how Vaz and Cook – in common with many contemporary 
cultural commentators – treated presumptions of British monoculture as part of an 
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ideological package which also included Anglocentrism. It is, then, instructive to note 
how the ‘waves of foreign influence’ repertoire that these speakers used to naturalise 
‘British’ polyculture in practice involved the adoption of an effectively Anglocentric 
historical narrative. Both Cook and Vaz tacitly took 1066 (the date of the Norman 
conquest of England) as the canonical historical landmark in the history of ‘Britain’. 
Cook, for example, referred to ‘our thousand years of history’ (extract 12), and Vaz 
referred explicitly to ‘1066, when we [sic] were invaded for the last time by the 
Normans’ (extract 13). Both Vaz and Cook universalised the experience of the 
Norman Conquest (of England), the rule of King Richard (of England), and the 
Roman occupation (of Britannia Major, but not of Caledonia). In contrast, it is 
instructive to note how the BNP version of the history of ‘our family of nations’ 
(reported in extract 17) studiously avoids this form of implicitly Anglocentric 
accounting. 
 It is also worth noting that the narrative of the gradual evolution of the Anglo 
British as an amalgam of different peoples and cultures that Vaz and Cook employ 
does not represent a novel, post-colonial, form of historiography (Todd, 1994).  In the 
past, this kind of representation has been apparent in the formulation of the English as 
a ‘mongrel race’, or, in Defoe’s (1703) words, ‘That het'rogeneous thing, an 
Englishman’. Far from constituting a distinctively twenty-first century form of 
representation, images of the Anglo British as an historical hybrid of different peoples 
was regularly employed in nineteenth century history texts produced for children, 
such as Dickens’s (1853) A Child’s History of England: 
 Little by little, strangers became mixed with the Islanders, 
 and the savage Britons grew into a wild, bold people (p.8). 
 
 This kind of formulation could be used to support a range of rhetorical 
projects. Defoe himself used references to the ‘het’rogeneous’ heritage of the 
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population of England to parody contemporary forms of anti-French sentiment based 
on appeals to a supposedly distinctive and enduring English national character. In the 
nineteenth century this representation of national diversity and hybridity was used to 
positively differentiate England and the English from nations whose claims to identity 
emphasized the existence of cultural homogeneity (as was emerging in France) or a 
common genetic ‘stock’ (as was emerging in Germany) (Young, 1995). 
 In the first half of the twentieth century, images of Anglo/British ancestral 
and cultural diversity and hybridity were still current. The example below, taken from 
Dixon’s book The Englishman published in 1938, has evident parallels with the kind 
of account presented above (e.g. extract 20) in which contemporary politicians 
celebrate the uniquely plural ancestry of the population of the UK: 
 The island, the geographical unit, bound its inhabitants 
 together, made of the various tribes a common people, a group, 
 a community, and finally a nation, living and working together 
 to common ends. This, then, is England’s peculiarity, a firm 
 island unity imposed upon and embracing the most extreme 
 racial variety anywhere to be found within such limits in all 
 the world. (p. 101).  
 
 
By the nineteen thirties, this type of representation was not being used simply 
as a basis from which to cast Anglo British national chauvinism as fundamentally 
irrational, nor to present ‘our’ nation as superior to others (although such arguments 
were still current). Significantly, in the run-up to the second world war, arguments 
concerning the racial and cultural diversity of contemporary nations was also inclined 
to be grated a quasi-universal status, in a manner which contrasts markedly with their 
use by Vaz and by Cook at the start of the twenty-first century. Although 
contemporary authors pointed to the ‘peculiarity’ of the Anglo British condition of 
cultural hybridity and diversity, the difference between ‘our’ country and others could 
be treated as one of degree rather than kind. For example, Dixon, also noted that:    
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  ‘The peoples and races we know, the inhabitants of the world 
 today, are without exception, mixed races and peoples’ (p. 19) 
 
Unlike Vaz and Cook, Dixon specifically emphasised how the especial diversity of 
‘England and the English’ represented part and parcel of a more generic, pan-
European, condition: 
 ‘Overlook this ethnic complex and we shall certainly be at a 
 loss to understand England and the English. ”It has been said 
 of Europe in general, and particularly of Western Europe, that 
 it constituted a cul-de-sac, in which masses of immigrants 
 succeeded or were heaped upon each other.” So with our own 
 country’ (p. 88) 
 
In addition, unlike Vaz and Cook, Dixon also suggested that the Angles and Saxons 
were not an ethnically singular or indigenous people.  
This is not, of course, to say that Dixon’s accounts of the fictive nature of all 
appeals to ethnic nationalism was devoid of connotations of Anglo British 
chauvinism. On the contrary the very act of flagging an awareness of the racially and 
culturally diverse heritages of national populations was clearly designed to display the 
comparative moral and intellectual superiority of Anglo British national 
consciousness over the irredentist politics of Nazi Germany.  
 
(ii) Diversity and tolerance as positive autostereotypes of British Imperial Polity 
 In extracts 1 and 11, Keith Vaz presented Imperial constructions of British 
identity as comparatively ‘narrow’, and as racially and culturally exclusive. Although 
this kind of representation is commonly found in lay historiography (Condor, in 
press), Imperial Britain was in fact typically valorised as a multi-racial and multi-
cultural as well as a multi-national, polity. In fact, it is only since the break-up of the 
Empire (and the substitution of the legal status of British imperial subject with that of 
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British state citizen) that increasingly restrictive bureaucratic criteria of membership 
have come to be formulated and applied.  
Favell (1998) has noted how concerns on the part of successive UK 
governments over the economic and moral value of a racially and culturally neutral 
understanding of Britishness within the domestic sphere may be traced directly to the 
distinctive strategies of British Imperial governance, and in particular the policy of 
‘indirect rule’ whereby colonial governance was effected by bolstering indigenous 
cultures and supporting indigenous rulers.  A good deal of the self-celebratory 
rhetoric of British Imperialism in fact emphasised the moral, aesthetic, economic and 
military advantages of a multi-racial polity characterised by seeming infinite cultural 
variety (Cannadine, 2001). Examples of the valorisation of the racial and cultural 
diversity of the Empire’s subjects may readily be identified in didactic texts, as 
illustrated by the following extract from Newland & Donald’s (1923) school primer, 
The Model Citizen: 
 The British Empire is one of the marvels of the world […] a 
 dominion composed of widely scattered parts, separated by […] 
 differences of religion, customs, traditions, race, and colour; 
 and yet united under one king, one flag, and one empire. This 
 vast domain, more than eleven millions of square miles in 
 extent, has been built up by the pluck, enterprise, and tact of 
 our forefathers, and it has been handed down to us as a 
 heritage of which we are rightly proud’ (p. 185). 
 
Note how, like Robin Cook in extract 5, Newland and Donald attribute the 
existence of the Empire as a successful multi-racial, multi-cultural community to 
enduring British values (although unlike Cook they are prepared to specify these as 
‘pluck’, ‘enterprise’ and ‘tact’). 
We have seen how Robin Cook in 2001 used references to statistical facts to 
emphasise the extent and distinctiveness of UK ethnic diversity. Similarly, the 
cultural and racial diversity of the populations of British Imperial possessions was 
frequently calibrated for rhetorical effect. The following extract from Cooper’s (1921) 
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text for children, How the Empire Grew, is notably similar to Robin Cook’s 
metropolitan version quoted above in extract 23: 
  In this empire of ours these are nearly as many blacks as there 
 are whites, and three times as many browns … the British empire 
 includes as many Chinese as there are in Peking, and six times 
 as many Arabs as there are in all Arabia (p. 132).  
 
 
I noted above how Keith Vaz implicitly treated UK government policies of 
multiculturalism as superior to the strategies of social integration used in many other 
EU member states, which ‘just assimilat[e] people’.  It is interesting, then, to note that 
during the age of Imperialism, authors regularly asserted the superiority of the British 
policy of ‘indirect rule’ as compared to the French Imperial policy that involved the 
cultural assimilation of subject peoples. In the following extract, Newland and Donald 
(1923, p. 205) emphasise this point by stressing how British subjects of French origin 
benefited from the comparatively ‘liberal’ form of British imperial governance: 
 
 When the English conquered Quebec, they did not inflict 
 indignity upon the vanquished people by imposing upon them 
 another language and another religion. They not only left the 
 French all the liberty which they had previously enjoyed, but 
 gave them more.  
 
I noted above how contemporary politicians may shroud their celebratory accounts of 
the superiority of the form of citizenship adopted in the UK beneath a tactful 
recognition of national differences (see extract 22 above). Similarly, Newland and 
Donald (p. 238) encouraged their young readers to display the British virtue of tact 
when faced with alternative forms of citizenship characteristic of less fortunate or 
enlightened foreigners: 
 There are people in every land who love freedom and justice, 
 who have their citizen rights and perform their citizen duties, 
 although such rights and duties may not be so many or quite the 
 same as ours. We should always remember, then, to do justice to 
 foreigners, as we should like them to do justice to us.   
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Concluding comments  
  
 In this paper I have been arguing that in so far as we are concerned to resist 
processes of racialization, we need to appreciate the complex ways in which mediated 
representations of race and culture come to be articulated in conjunction with 
representations of nation and state. In order to illustrate this point, I took what might, 
at a superficial level, be regarded as a relatively ‘hard case’. In considering political 
speeches, I have been looking at forms of rhetoric which were not spontaneously-
produced, had been informed by current social scientific thinking, and had almost 
certainly been crafted and edited with a view to ensuring their logical coherence and 
internal consistency. In addition, rather than focussing on forms of talk which we 
would conventionally be inclined to view as ‘racist discourse’ (within which 
contradictions have regularly been noted, e.g. Wetherell & Potter, 1992), I considered 
polemical rhetoric designed precisely to resist ethno-cultural representations of 
British identity, society and polity. For social psychologists resident in the UK, it is 
quite likely that the kinds of arguments presented by Keith Vaz and Robin Cook 
would be accepted in general (if not necessarily on all points of detail) as 
representations that are not only ‘of us’, and ‘for us’, but also ‘like ours’. 
Consequently, one objective of this paper was to stimulate critical reflexivity on the 
part of social representations researchers, and to inoculate against the comfortable 
presumption that whereas ‘other’ people’s representations of the social and political 
world may be characterised by incoherence, tension and ambivalence, ‘ours’ are 
necessarily characterised by a simple rational integrity (see Ashmore, 1989; Condor, 
1997b, for similar arguments in relation to discourse analytic perspectives on 
valiability). 
36 
 In particular, my analysis has focussed the inherent limitations of those 
attempts to resist racialized representations ‘of us’ and ‘for us’, which tacitly limit the 
‘us’-category to the population (or citizenry) of a particular nation or state. In this 
respect, we must bear in mind that many of the apparently generic terms that we use 
routinely – including that slippery term ‘society’ and apparently innocuous referents 
like ‘people’ - often implicitly presuppose a nationally-circumscribed frame of 
reference.  To return to the specific topic of this conference, we may note that the 
constructs of  ‘social representations’ and ‘the media’ rarely in practice refer to a 
phenomenon or agent understood to traverse national boundaries (although see Rosie 
et al., 2004).  Unless we become alert to the ways in which concerns over ‘social 
exclusion’ on the basis of race or ethnicity routinely operate through an implicitly 
nationalized understanding of the ultimate possibilities for ‘social inclusion’, we may 
– like Keith Vaz and Robin Cook - paradoxically end up subtly reproducing similar 
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